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The War on Secretary Stanton.

The late miscarriage which "strategy" made before Richmond has excited all the semi-secesh and bogus "conservative" elements to find a scapegoat. The achievement of going round Robin Hood's barn to capture Richmond, and of subjecting a rich and noble army to swamp malaria for many weeks has somewhat marred the young Napoleon's chances for the Presidency; and to retrieve this now palpable blunder we have a furious onslaught on Secretary Stanton. Stanton's "voice is still for war," not strategy; he thinks war is designed to hurt your enemies all you can for the time being, and that digging ditches and acting on the defensive when you are expecting to conquer a peace is not the way to conquer it. So, of course, as McClellan's poor capacity for planning campaigns has been exposed; his admirers are furious for Stanton's official head.

The particular grievance of these demagogues is that McClellan was not reinforced before the late battles. They howl by the column over this, and then in the same breath tell about McClellan's "great victory." If he gained a victory where was the need of his reinforcements? However, we have not taken the contract to reconcile the absurdities of these semi-secesh Democrats and Republican flunkies, and so somebody else may shoulder the job of reconciling these palpable absurdities.

Where were these reinforcements to come from? Nobody hinted before the late battles that Halleck could spare them — his strategy needed them in the West. There were too few troops already in the Shenandoah valley, as Banks, Fremont, Sigel, Shields and a few other Generals could testify to if they tried. — For McDowell to join forces in the Chickahominy swamps with McClellan would only have left open a rebel road to Washington and had he advanced direct a heavy rebel force concentrated on the usual plan, would have crushed him. That ends the reinforcement question as far at least as suggestions were made before the late disasters. Now the Government discovers that Burnside can lend a hand, but how many battles we shall have to fight over again because of his retirement Northward remains to be seen. It certainly was no part of the "anaconda" plan that after conquering North Carolina Burnside should abandon it to help McClellan out of his scrapes. Anacondaism had enough of stupidity in it, but it didn't contemplate doing one job over several times.

Mr. Stanton has his faults — so has every man — but the game is now to magnify Stanton's faults ten fold in order to belittle McClellan's. The country sees now that the Yorktown and Chickahominy route to Richmond was a monstrous blunder. There was a straight road to take from Manassas thro' a rich and fertile country with a railroad for supplies and communication. Advancing by that route the whole Union force on the Potomac could have been massed and pushed forward without danger to Washington from any Jackson. But a miserable swamp route was chosen which killed off probably as many soldiers as did the bullets of the rebels, and then to wind up we have the late disasters. That is all there is of the justifying causes for this war on Secretary Stanton.

Senator Chandler undoubtedly told the truth the other day, approximately at least, when he said in the Senate that the blame rested on either Gen. McClellan or the President. It will be found to rest somewhat on both. The President could have overruled McClellan's Robin Hood route, but in his amiability, and determination to give the great bepuffed "a chance," he made a mistake. The council of war which debated the plan was against it, but the President — as all accounts seem to agree - gave the decision. His rule of action, in general, has been not to interfere in the plans of high officers.

We wish he had made fewer exceptions to this rule, or more of them. In the one case he would not have sanctioned the Fremont persecution; in the other some better General with less strategy and more fight in him than McClellan would ere this have carried our flag into Richmond. But as he has thus far stood by Stanton — a man of his own selection, and one who has not seriously displeased many except his old friends, who are disappointed in not being able to use him to their profit and his hurt — we are hopeful that no change will be made. The indications are that Stanton and McClellan will both be retained. Both are useful in their spheres — McClellan fights well, but the trouble is, that, no matter what his force he always lets the enemy choose his time for the attack. Stanton's chief blunder is his news suppression tactics, but if he don't unlearn that absurdity after being in office as long as McClellan has been, then we may vote to put him out. At present let the President rebuke Stanton's revilers, hurry up the volunteer business, kick Kentucky when she next volunteers impertinent advice, invite the niggers to strike for their freedom and the safety of the nation, and push on the column generally. Then we shall be ready for England when she ventures to thrust her mediatorial nose into our affairs.